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Abstract. A wide-range of personal and sensitive information are stored
in users’ online accounts. Losing access, or an unauthorized access to one
of those accounts could put them into the risks of privacy breach, cause
financial loss, and compromise their accessibility to important informa-
tion and documents. A large body of prior work focused on developing
new schemes and strategies to protect users’ online security. However,
there is a dearth in existing literature to understand users’ strategies
and contingency plans to protect their online accounts once they lose
access, or identify an unauthorized access to one of their accounts. We
addressed this gap in our work, where we conducted semi-structured in-
terview with 59 participants from three different countries: Bangladesh,
Turkey, and USA. Our findings reveal the unawareness, misconceptions,
and privacy and accessibility concerns of users, which refrain them from
taking security-preserving steps to protect their online accounts. We also
identified users’ prevention strategies that could put their online security
into further risks.
Keywords: User Behavior · Qualitative Study · Protection Strategy ·
Contingency Plan · Online Accounts · Cross-cultural Study
1 Introduction
The authentication secrets of 620 million user accounts are stolen by adversaries
from 16 different websites [39], where many users are unsure of how they could
recover access to their accounts [26]. Users are found to understand the risks
of data breaches [20], however, their security behavior is influenced by costs
The article is published in HCII 2021. This is the author’s copy of the accepted
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associated with protective measures, where they have a general tendency towards
delaying action until harm has occurred [41]. The study of Marques et al. [24]
investigated users’ perceptions of unauthorized physical access to smartphones,
where they analyzed the relation between social trust, personal relationship, and
security vulnerabilities.
To prevent unauthorized access to users’ accounts, the prior studies focused
on studying users’ password management strategies [34,25,22], improving the
security and usability of authentication schemes [5,8,3], developing automated
techniques to detect unauthorized access to an account [21], and designing edu-
cational tools and warning system to prevent social engineering attacks [6,23,33].
However, a little study is conducted to date, to understand users’ behavior once
they lose access or identify an unauthorized access to their online account. To
address this gap, we focused on the following research questions in our work:
i) How do users respond to a situation when they lose access, or identify an
unauthorized access to their online account? ii) What are the strategies and
contingency plans of users to protect their online accounts in the future? iii)
How do users’ strategies and contingency plans to protect their online accounts
vary across geographic regions?
The study of Haque et al. [17] divided online accounts into four categories
(e.g., financial, identity, content, and sketchy), where they emphasized on the
protection of financial, and identity accounts (e.g., email, social networking).
Thus, our study focused on user’s protection behavior for financial and iden-
tity accounts, considering the sensitivity of user information stored, or shared
through these accounts. Security and Privacy, being contextual, demand a sit-
uated understanding of user’s perceptions and behavior in order to explore the
design and policy practices [27,28,13]. Thus, it is important to investigate the se-
curity perceptions and behavior of users beyond Western contexts. In our study,
we conducted semi-structured interview with 59 participants from three different
countries, including Bangladesh (a developing country located in South Asia),
Turkey (a developing country straddling Eastern Europe and Western Asia), and
USA (a developed country in North America).
Contributions. Our findings reveal the unawareness and uncertainty of
participants in taking appropriate steps once they lose access or identify an
unauthorized access to their online account. In this context, we unpack the mis-
conceptions of participants, which refrain them from taking security-preserving
actions, or lead them to adopt prevention strategy that could put their online
security into further risks. Our results shed light on the relation between users’
security behavior to protect their online accounts, privacy concern with sharing
personal information for secondary authentication (used to recover access to an
account, like when password is forgotten [38]), and their perceptions of accessi-
bility related to two-factor authentication. Taken together, our study contributes
to advance the understanding of Security and HCI community on users’ security
vulnerabilities and usability challenges in protecting their online accounts.
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2 Related Work
In this section, we first report the findings from prior studies on user’s security
perceptions and behavior, followed by a discussion on notable usable security
and privacy studies conducted outside the Western regions.
The study of Ion et. al. [18] compared the online security practices of ex-
pert and non-expert users, where they found differences in their security be-
havior. For instances, expert users generally install updates, use password man-
ager, and leverage two-factor authentication, where the non-expert users prefer
to use antivirus application, change their passwords, and visit only the known
websites [18]. Karunakaran et. al. [20] investigated users’ expectations of how
companies should respond to data breaches. The authors [20] found that users
understand the risk of data leakage, and have certain expectations from the or-
ganizations in case of a data breach, which include sending users an immediate
notification, enabling two-factor authentication, and resetting their passwords.
The study of Zou et. al. [41] focused on Equifax data breach, where the
findings revealed users’ perceived risks of data leakage. The authors [41] identi-
fied the factors that could influence users towards not taking a protective mea-
sure, which include but not limited to the optimism bias, procrastination until
harms occur, and the costs of taking a security-preserving action. In a separate
study [30], Ruoti et. al. found that users’ security behavior depend upon their
understanding of a threat, evaluation of risks, and the estimation of impact,
where they select coping strategies based on their evaluation of the trade-offs
between potential harms and the costs to take protective measures.
Although local values often contrast with the liberal notions of privacy and
security embedded in current computing systems [4,1,11], the digital privacy and
security research beyond Western contexts is still at its very early stage [12,37].
In a recent study [29], the author recruited participants from both within and
outside of Western countries. The findings from this study [29] show that the
user’s behavioral response to a suspicious login attempt to their Facebook ac-
count depends upon their awareness, and mental model of the incident, where
cultural background and past experiences could also influence their security de-
cision.
Although online threats are global, perceptions of threat are very local-
ized [4,16,36,11]. The study of Al-Ameen et al. [4] explored how users balance
their needs, conveniences, and privacy in the context of data collection and shar-
ing by smartphone apps, and unveiled how privacy leakage incidents affect app
usage behavior in the Global South. The study of Haque et al. [16] shed light
on how situated morality influence the privacy behavior of people in the digital
service centers at Bangladesh. In a study conducted in urban Ghana [11], the
participants reported confidence of being able to defend against cyberattacks
despite passwords often being their only line of defense.
Digital devices, such as mobile phones that are designed for developing re-
gions often fail to satisfy their local needs. In a study conducted with low-
literate Berber women in Morocco [14], the authors identified that the lack of
functional literacy presented significant barriers to using mobile phones. The
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studies conducted by Ahmed et al. [2] and Sambasivan et al. [32] demonstrate
that the mobile phones often do not have one-to-one mapping with a user in
the resource-constrained settings of developing countries, where a recent study
with the women in Global South [31] examined the privacy negotiation of female
users from their family members while using a mobile phone.
Our Study. The findings from these studies indicate that there is a dearth
in existing literature to understand users’ strategies and contingency plans to
protect their online accounts once they lose access, or identify an unauthorized
access to one of their accounts. We addressed this gap in our work.
3 Methodology
We conducted semi-structured interview with 59 participants. We recruited par-
ticipants through sharing the study information via email and online social me-
dia, posting flyers on public places, snowball sampling, and leveraging authors’
personal connections. We interviewed the participant over telephone, via Skype,
or in person. Our study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at our university.
3.1 Procedure
The interviews were conducted in the country’s official language. That is, the
interviews with the participants living in the USA, Bangladesh, and Turkey were
conducted in English, Bengali, and Turkish, respectively. During the interview,
we asked them a set of questions on online accounts, in particular, financial and
identity accounts (e.g., email, social networking). Participants were asked about
their past experience of losing access to their financial and identity accounts,
identifying an unauthorized access to any of these accounts, and what protection
steps they had taken in such instances. At the end, participants responded to
a set of demographic questionnaire. The interviews were audio recorded. On
average, each session took between 20 and 30 minutes.
3.2 Analysis
We transcribed the audio recordings. For the interviews with the participants
from Bangladesh and Turkey, the researchers who are the native speaker of Ben-
gali and Turkish translated the transcriptions into English. We then performed
thematic analysis on our transcriptions [9,10]. Two researchers independently
read through the transcripts of half of the interviews, developed codes, com-
pared them, and then iterated again with more interviews until we had devel-
oped a consistent codebook. Once the codebook was finalized, two researchers
divided up the remaining interviews and coded them. After all interviews had
been coded, both researchers spot-checked the other’s coded transcripts and did
not find any inconsistencies. Finally, we organized and taxonomized our codes
into higher-level categories.
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Table 1. The Highlight of Participants’ Demographic Traits [*Either completed or
currently studying at the noted education level] Note: UP : Participants living in the
USA; BP : Participants living in Bangladesh; TP : Participants living in Turkey
Gender Participants
Male BP1-BP3, BP6-BP9, BP11, BP15, BP17-BP29,
UP1-UP4, UP7, UP8, UP10-UP12, UP14-UP16,
UP18, UP20-UP22, TP1, TP3, TP4, TP6, TP8
Female BP4, BP5, BP10, BP12-BP14, BP16, UP5, UP6,
UP9, UP13, UP17, UP19, TP2, TP5, TP7
Age-range
18-24 BP4, BP7, BP8, UP5, UP6, UP19, UP21, UP22
25-29 BP2, BP3, BP5, BP6, BP9, BP19, BP20, BP25,
UP2, UP7-UP15, UP18, UP20, TP1-TP3
30-34 BP1, BP17, BP18, BP21, BP24, BP28, UP1,
UP3, UP16, UP17
35-39 BP23, TP6
40-44 BP16, BP22, BP26, BP27, BP29, UP4
45-49 BP14, TP4, TP7
50-54 BP15, TP5, TP8
55+ BP10, BP11, BP12, BP13
Literacy Level*
Fifth Grade BP19, BP27, BP29, TP6, TP7
Between Eighth BP17, BP20, BP22, BP24, BP25, BP26,
and Tenth Grade BP28, TP4
Twelfth Grade BP12, BP18, BP21, BP23, UP19, UP21, UP22,
TP2, TP5, TP8
Undergraduate BP1-BP11, BP13-BP16, UP1-UP18, UP20, TP1,
and above TP3
Profession
Student BP4, BP5, BP7, BP9, UP1-UP3, UP6-UP14,
UP18, UP19, UP22
Employee at BP1-BP3, BP6, BP8, BP11, BP17-BP19,
Industry BP21-BP29, UP5, TP3, TP4, TP6
Employee at Educational BP10, BP15, UP4, UP15-UP17, UP20,
or Non-profit Org. UP21, TP1
Car Driver BP20




Table 1 presents the demographic information of our 59 participants, where 16
of them are women, and 43 are men. Almost all of our participants were in the
age range of 18 to 55, where four participants were above 55 years old. The
literacy level of 39% of our participants was between fifth and twelfth grade,
where others were either undergraduate students or had already earned the de-
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gree. Thirty-two percent of our participants were students, where others were
from diverse professions, including physician, car driver, housewife, and the em-
ployee at industry, educational institution, or non-profit organization. Among
our participants, twenty two of them live in the USA, eight participants live in
Turkey, and 29 participants live in Bangladesh. In this paper, the participants
living in the USA, Bangladesh, and Turkey are denoted by UP, BP, and TP,
respectively.
4 Results
Twenty-six (USA: 17, Bangladesh and Turkey: 9) out of 59 participants reported
losing access, or identifying unauthorized access to their financial, or identity
account, where we unpacked their strategies to regain access and protect their
accounts. For other participants, we reported their contingency plan in case of
losing access or identifying an unauthorized access in the future (see §4.3).
4.1 Losing Access to Online Account
Nineteen participants (USA: 12, Bangladesh and Turkey: 7) reported losing ac-
cess to at least one of their financial, or identity (e.g., email, or social networking)
accounts, where most of them could not recover the access. Below, we report our
findings revealing why participants lost access to their accounts.
Lack or Failure of Secondary Authentication. Among the participants
who lost access to their financial or identity accounts, about half of them includ-
ing from all three countries reported that they could not recover the access upon
forgetting their primary authentication code, e.g., password. Among them, some
participants failed to recover their access as they forgot their secondary authen-
tication code. For instance, UP19 could not recall the answer to her security
question for secondary authentication: “There were some other special questions
that asked like, what was your third grade teacher or some special question, and
I just didn’t remember them. So I had to create another email [account].” UP15
reported losing access to his online bank account as he could not recall his email
ID connected to that account for secondary authentication. Several participants
lost access to their account as they had not set a secondary authentication code
during account creation, where UP3 commented, “I think that if I designed some
security question at the beginning of creating account, now I would not lose that
access and recover my account.”
BP20 could not recover access to one of his online accounts upon forgetting
the primary authentication code where he also forgot the password of his email
account that was registered for secondary authentication. UP1 commented, “I
lost like many times, I mean my email accounts”. Including UP1, a few partici-
pants lost access to their online accounts multiple times due to forgetting their
authentication codes. TP8 has reported, several online accounts require him to
change his password once every three months, which makes it difficult for him
to remember the new password.
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Geographic Relocation. Several U.S. participants reported geographic relo-
cation as the reason behind losing access to their online accounts. Many service
providers block suspicious login attempts from an unusual location to protect
their users’ online accounts from unauthorized access. In such cases, a user might
be asked to prove her identity by entering a one-time-code delivered to her phone
number, registered with the system [15]. We found that such security measures
could pose accessibility challenges to users, causing them to lose access to their
online accounts. For instance, one of our participants (UP17) who moved to the
USA from a country in Asia, could no longer authenticate to her social net-
working account after geographic relocation. Her login attempt from the USA
was considered suspicious by the system, where she could not prove her identity
through her phone number in the USA as it was not registered with her account.
UP15 mentioned that he was blocked from accessing his email account:
“There was one email account that I lost completely because I had not connected
my phone number with it, and I tried using it from a different country using a
wrong password and it blocked me out.” He then contacted the customer service
to recover his account: “I tried calling them. For some reason that did not work
and you know what happened after that [could no longer access this account].
Due to the risks of information leakage, he reported concern about registering
his phone number with an online account.
Adversary’s Action. Among those participants who lost access to online ac-
counts, several of them reported that their account was hacked followed by chang-
ing the authentication code by adversaries. BP5 reported an incident of losing
access to multiple online accounts, where a social networking account, hacked
by the adversary was linked to other accounts through a single sign-on feature.
Most participants are not sure whether they were the victim of a targeted attack
by someone they know, or their passwords were leaked to unknown attackers.
UP4, who lost access to his social networking account, perceives that the leak-
age of his password could be prevented if the service provider would have taken
appropriate measures to protect users’ credentials.
BP10 reported an incident of robbery, where the attacker forcefully gained
access to victim’s bank account from his smartphone. In another instance, the
attacker demanded ransom from BP20 over phone threatening our participant to
ruin his reputation through posting inappropriate contents on the hacked social
networking account.
4.2 Unauthorized Access to Online Account
Thirteen participants (USA: 7, Bangladesh and Turkey: 6) reported that they
had identified unauthorized access to at least one of their financial or identity
accounts, where they did not lose access to that account. Among them, a few
participants identified unauthorized access to their social networking account
through checking the activity log, where most of others reported, they got aware
of unauthorized access through email notification from the service provider. For
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Fig. 1. Prevention Strategies and Contingency Plan of Our Participants
instance, UP1 mentioned an email delivered to him, which provided him with the
location information of an adversary logging into his social networking account.
This participant perceives that the service providers of different online accounts
work together to protect their users’ online security, which assures him that he
does not need to worry about unauthorized access to his online accounts.
UP2 reported an incident where he received an email asking him to change his
password for a bank account, because “someone else was using my information,
hacked the account or something.” The similar incidents were reported by BP5
and UP18, where they received an email asking to change their authentication
secret for a social networking account. UP12 mentioned, “Once I got an email
from Gmail that someone is trying to access my account and gave me a link [to
change password]...I went to the link and changed my password.”
TP8 reported that his bank account was accessed from a foreign country, in-
curring him financial loss. He suspects, he was a victim of phishing attack, where
his bank account was accessed after he had provided his account information in
a website that tricked him to believe that he had won a lottery.
4.3 Prevention Strategy & Contingency Plan
Twenty-six participants reported that they had lost access, or identified unau-
thorized access (but did not lose access) to one of their financial or identity
accounts. A few participants encountered both instances. In this section, we re-
port our findings on the steps taken by our participants upon losing access or
identifying unauthorized access to their accounts (Figure 1 illustrates the pre-
vention strategy and contingency plan of our participants).
Who Lost Access to Online Account. UP15 lost access to his email account
as he forgot his password and could not leverage secondary authentication due to
geographic relocation (e.g., moving to a new country). To prevent such incident
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from happening in the future, he now stores his authentication secrets to address
the memorability issue: “I try to save my password somewhere whether it is in
browser or in a text file.” Most of our participants who lost access to their
online accounts because of not setting a secondary authentication method, now
store their primary authentication code, e.g., password in a digital (e.g., text
file, email) or physical medium (e.g., notebook). UP1 said, “I just take the note
like, you know, to my notebook. And I just use that one to reach my account,
just to remember my password...And the steps I took like are working very well
for now.”
Participants who store their password in a physical medium reported confi-
dence in securing that from unwanted entities. For instance, UP9 commented,
“I am more aware [now] and so like I write them [passwords] down. But no
one will see it but myself.” Participants who could not recover their accounts
due to forgetting secondary authentication code (e.g., answer to a security ques-
tion), consider it as a safer option to write down the answers to their security
questions for secondary authentication, instead of storing their primary authen-
tication code (e.g., password). Our participants store their password, or answer
to a security question in plaintext.
Among those participants whose online accounts were compromised by the
adversary, UP4 mentioned creating a stronger password for his new account to
prevent such incident from happening in the future: “I chose a longer password.”
The other participants did not report taking any security-preserving steps to pro-
tect their online accounts from an unauthorized access. Some of them, including
from all three countries feel helpless in face of adversary’s action, and are unsure
of how they could protect their online security. For example, when we asked
about their steps, taken to prevent unauthorized access to their accounts in the
future, UP2 said, “I cannot do anything.” Similarly, TP8 perceives that it is not
possible to recover an online account if it is compromised by an adversary, in
which case, the victim would need to create a new account. In this context, a few
U.S. participants reported a contingency plan that they would meet the customer
service personnel in person, if their online accounts are further compromised by
an adversary.
Who Identified Unauthorized Access. Among the participants from all
three countries who identified unauthorized access to their online account, most
of them did not take any preventive steps. We found that participants place
trust on the service provider to protect their online security. For instances, a
few participants believe that the service providers take required steps whenever
an adversary attempts to compromise their account, and notify them through
email when such unauthorized attempts to access their account fail due to orga-
nization’s security protection in place.
Some participants do not have a clear idea about what steps they should take
once an unauthorized access is identified, where UP18 said, “I don’t know what
to do...what i am going to do. I don’t know.” TP8 experienced unauthorized
access to his bank account. Including him, a few other participants mentioned
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the importance of being more careful about security issues, however, they were
unsure of the strategy or plan that could protect their online accounts from
unauthorized access in the future.
A few participants from Bangladesh and USA reported to change their pass-
word of email and social networking account using the link provided in the email
that had informed them about an unauthorized access to their account. In this
context, UP13 did not change her password for the account where an unautho-
rized access was identified, rather she set up security questions and added a
recovery email ID for secondary authentication, so that she could recover her
access to that account if the primary authentication code is changed by the
adversary. She preferred not to add her mobile phone number for two-factor
authentication as she was concerned that she might not be able to access her
account when she would be out of her phone’s network coverage.
Once UP21 identified an unauthorized access to his social networking account
through checking the activity log, he considered that deleting that account would
be the best line of defense to protect his personal information. Then, he took a
series of steps to prevent unauthorized access in the future. He created a new
social networking account, and divided his online accounts into two categories:
‘important’ and ‘non-important’. For his ‘important’ accounts, he created new
passwords that are different from each other, as this participant was afraid that
the adversary accessing his social networking account might be able to guess his
password for other accounts. He then activated two-factor authentication for his
‘important’ accounts by adding his phone number.
Others. Among those participants who did not lose access or identify any unau-
thorized access to their online accounts, a few of them were confident that they
would not encounter any such incidents in the future, where UP6 commented,
“They [adversaries] cannot get my password.” We identified uncertainty among
participants from all three countries when we asked them about their contin-
gency plan in case they lose access to an online account. Several U.S. partici-
pants mentioned, they would contact the tech support of the service provider,
however, were not sure how to reach out to them. Here, UP22 mentioned that
he would contact the upper management in Google if his access to email account
is compromised.
If an unauthorized access to the online account is identified, several partici-
pants mentioned that they would change the password of that account. However,
UP7 and TP6 also reported uncertainty if this step would be sufficient to protect
their account from the adversary. In this context, UP10 and UP11 believe that
the only way to protect an account is to delete it upon identifying an unau-
thorized access. UP10 would also reach out to the law enforcement agency to
identify the adversary in order to protect his online accounts; he added, “[It is]
always difficult to track who is trying to hack your account. But I think this day
with technology, I’ve heard police is able to track or know who is sending what
from where.” Similarly, several participants from Bangladesh and Turkey who
did not lose access, or identify an unauthorized access to their online account,
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mentioned that they would ask help from the law enforcement authority if they
identify an unauthorized access to their online account in the future.
UP22 reported using an antivirus software in his computer, where he per-
ceives that the antivirus application would protect his computer and online ac-
counts from adversaries. A few participants keep local backup of their personal
documents and photos that are shared or stored online, so that they do not
lose access to those files in case their email or social networking accounts are
compromised.
5 Discussion
5.1 Prevention Strategies, Risks, & Concerns
Our findings indicate that the prevention strategies taken by users upon losing
access to an online account could increase their exposure to cyber attacks, and
in turn, weaken their security protection. Forgetting passwords, coupled with
geographic relocation or the failure/lack of secondary authentication caused our
participants losing access to their online account. As a prevention strategy, they
started to write down their password (in plaintext) on paper, or store that in
a digital medium, e.g., textfile or email. Participants who could not leverage
secondary authentication to recover their account due to forgetting answers to
security questions, now write down those answers to address the memorability
issue. However, writing down or storing password in an unprotected medium
could lead to password leakage [40], increasing the risks of unauthorized access
to their online accounts. The future research should further investigate how users
protect the medium that they use to write down their passwords.
Our participants mentioned the email notification that asked to change their
password for an online account. It was out of the scope of this study to verify
the legitimacy of the reported emails, however, we note that the dependency
of participants on email notifications to identify an unauthorized access could
be exploited by adversaries to conduct phishing attacks [6]. The future research
should explore the relation between users’ strategies to protect their online ac-
counts and underlying susceptibility to social engineering attacks, e.g., phishing.
Our results show that the uncertainty about accessibility could refrain users
from taking security-preserving steps to protect their online accounts. While one-
time password based two-factor authentication using mobile phones contribute
to enhance online security [15], participants reported concern that they might
loose access to their online account if they are out of their cellphone’s network
coverage, e.g., due to geographic relocation. Also, participants worried about
privacy leakage in sharing their mobile phone number with the service providers.
5.2 Security (Mis)conceptions
In this section, we discuss about the misconceptions of participants, which give
them a false sense of security in protecting their online accounts. We emphasize
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that future research should focus on identifying appropriate measures to alleviate
user’s misconceptions, so that they could make an informed security decision.
Writing down a secondary authentication code in an unprotected medium
could be as vulnerable as writing down a primary authentication secret (e.g.,
password); if adversaries gain access to the answer of a security question, they
could exploit the secondary authentication method to compromise a user’s ac-
count [19,40]. However, the participants who write down their secondary authen-
tication code (e.g., answer to a security question), perceive it as a more secure
approach than writing down their password.
Some service providers (e.g., Google 4) inform their customers through email
about login from a new device or location, to help them with identifying unau-
thorized access and taking appropriate actions. However, the purpose of such
email notifications is misunderstood by several participants. As they perceive,
receiving such email indicates that adequate security measures are taken by the
service provider, requiring no further action at user’s end. Our findings indicate
the need of redesigning email-based security alerts, to help users with better
understanding of security risks and protective measures.
Participants place over-reliance on security software as they lack understand-
ing of how that system works. Antivirus application, in general, is designed to
protect a computer from malicious software [35], where a few participants per-
ceive that the antivirus application also protects their online accounts from the
adversaries. Such reliance provides them with a false sense of security, which in
turn, refrains them from taking security measures to protect their online account.
5.3 Similarities and Differences across Geographic Locations
Our findings show that more U.S. participants, in comparison to the participants
in Bangladesh and Turkey reported losing access or identifying unauthorized
access to their financial, or identity account. Participants’ responses on how
they had identified an unauthorized access were similar across all three countries.
While the lack or failure of secondary authentication, and adversary’s action are
reported by the participants from all three countries why they had lost access
to their online accounts, only U.S. participants mentioned geographic relocation
as the reason behind losing access to their account. It is possible, although
we cannot confirm from our study, that the participants from Bangladesh and
Turkey did not travel outside their country, and thus, did not experience losing
access to an online account due to geographic relocation.
Overall, we found similarities in protection strategies across the participants
from USA, Bangladesh, and Turkey. However, none of our participants from
Bangladesh and Turkey reported activating two-factor authentication when an
unauthorized access to their online account was identified, or contacting service
provider in case of losing access to their account. We believe, further investiga-
tions are required in the contexts of developing countries, including Bangladesh
4 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/2590353?hl=en
Understanding User’s Behavior and Protection Strategy 13
and Turkey to understand the availability and usability of two-factor authenti-
cation, and the scopes and challenges involved in getting help from the service
provider when a user loses access to her online account.
6 Limitations and Conclusion
We interviewed 59 participants in our study, where we followed the widely-used
methods for qualitative research [7,10,9], focusing in depth on a small number
of participants and continuing the interviews until no new themes emerged (sat-
uration). We acknowledge the limitations of such study that a different set of
samples might yield varying results. Thus, we do not draw any quantitative,
generalizable conclusion from this study. In addition, self-reported data might
have limitations, like recall and observer bias.
Despite these limitations, our study unpacks the strategies of users to protect
their online account, where we identified the unawareness, misconceptions, and
accessibility and privacy concerns of users that refrain them from taking security-
preserving steps. In our future work, we would conduct a large-scale survey with
the participants from diverse age-groups and literacy levels to attain quantitative
and more generalizable results.
References
1. Ahmed, S.I., Guha, S., Rifat, M.R., Shezan, F.H., Dell, N.: Privacy in repair:
An analysis of the privacy challenges surrounding broken digital artifacts in
bangladesh. In: Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies and Development. pp. 11:1–11:10. ICTD
’16, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/2909609.2909661
2. Ahmed, S.I., Haque, M.R., Chen, J., Dell, N.: Digital privacy challenges with shared
mobile phone use in bangladesh. Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 1(CSCW),
17:1–17:20 (Dec 2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3134652
3. Al-Ameen, M.N., Fatema, K., Wright, M., Scielzo, S.: The impact of cues and
user interaction on the memorability of system-assigned recognition-based graphi-
cal passwords. In: Eleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS
2015). pp. 185–196 (2015)
4. Al-Ameen, M.N., Tamanna, T., Nandy, S., Ahsan, M.A.M., Chandra, P., Ahmed,
S.I.: We don’t give a second thought before providing our information: Understand-
ing users’ perceptions of information collection by apps in urban bangladesh. In:
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCAS Conference on Computing and Sustainable
Societies (COMPASS’20). p. 32–43. Association for Computing Machinery, New
York, NY, USA (2020). https://doi.org/10.1145/3378393.3402244
5. Al-Ameen, M.N., Wright, M.: Exploring the potential of Geopass: A geographic
location-password scheme. Interacting with Computers 29(4), 605–627 (2017)
6. Alsharnouby, M., Alaca, F., Chiasson, S.: Why phishing still works: User strategies
for combating phishing attacks. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
82, 69–82 (2015)
7. Baxter, K., Courage, C., Caine, K.: Understanding Your Users: A Practical Guide
to User Research Methods. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA,
USA, 2 edn. (2015)
14 Kocabas et al.
8. Biddle, R., Chiasson, S., Van Oorschot, P.C.: Graphical passwords: Learning from
the first twelve years. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 44(4), 1–41 (2012)
9. Boyatzis, R.E.: Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code
development. sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA (1998)
10. Braun, V., Clarke, V.: Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research
in psychology 3(2), 77–101 (2006)
11. Chen, J., Paik, M., McCabe, K.: Exploring internet security perceptions and prac-
tices in urban ghana. In: Proceedings of the Tenth USENIX Conference on Usable
Privacy and Security. p. 129–142. SOUPS ’14, USENIX Association, USA (2014)
12. Cobb, C., Sudar, S., Reiter, N., Anderson, R., Roesner, F., Kohno, T.: Computer
security for data collection technologies. Development engineering 3, 1–11 (2018)
13. Crabtree, A., Tolmie, P., Knight, W.: Repacking ‘privacy’ for a net-
worked world. Comput. Supported Coop. Work 26(4-6), 453–488 (Dec 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10606-017-9276-y
14. Dodson, L.L., Sterling, S.R., Bennett, J.K.: Minding the gaps: Cultural, technical
and gender-based barriers to mobile use in oral-language berber communities in
morocco. In: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Information and
Communication Technologies and Development: Full Papers - Volume 1. p. 79–88.
ICTD ’13, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA (2013).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2516604.2516626
15. Eldefrawy, M.H., Alghathbar, K., Khan, M.K.: Otp-based two-factor authentica-
tion using mobile phones. In: Proceedings of the 2011 Eighth International Confer-
ence on Information Technology: New Generations. p. 327–331. ITNG ’11, IEEE
Computer Society, USA (2011), https://doi.org/10.1109/ITNG.2011.64
16. Haque, S.M.T., Haque, M.R., Nandy, S., Chandra, P., Al-Ameen, M.N.,
Guha, S., Ahmed, S.I.: Privacy vulnerabilities in public digital service cen-
ters in dhaka, bangladesh. In: Proceedings of the 2020 International Con-
ference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development.
ICTD2020, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1145/3392561.3394642
17. Haque, S.T., Wright, M., Scielzo, S.: A study of user password strategy for multi-
ple accounts. In: Proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Data and Appli-
cation Security and Privacy. p. 173–176. CODASPY ’13, Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, New York, NY, USA (2013), https://doi.org/10.1145/2435349.
2435373
18. Ion, I., Reeder, R., Consolvo, S.: “...no one can hack my mind”: Comparing ex-
pert and non-expert security practices. In: Proceedings of the Eleventh USENIX
Conference on Usable Privacy and Security. p. 327–346. SOUPS ’15, USENIX As-
sociation, USA (2015)
19. Just, M., Aspinall, D.: Personal choice and challenge questions: a security and
usability assessment. In: Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security. pp. 1–11 (2009)
20. Karunakaran, S., Thomas, K., Bursztein, E., Comanescu, O.: Data breaches: user
comprehension, expectations, and concerns with handling exposed data. In: Sym-
posium on Usable Privacy and Security. pp. 217–234 (2018)
21. King, M., Alhadidi, D., Cook, P.: Text-based detection of unauthorized users of
social media accounts. In: Canadian Conference on Artificial Intelligence. pp. 292–
297. Springer (2018)
22. Kothari, V., Koppel, R., Blythe, J., Smith, S.: Password logbooks and what their
amazon reviews reveal about their users’ motivations, beliefs, and behaviors. In:
European Workshop on Usable Security (2017)
Understanding User’s Behavior and Protection Strategy 15
23. Lastdrager, E., Gallardo, I.C., Hartel, P., Junger, M.: How effective is anti-phishing
training for children? In: Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. pp. 229–239
(2017)
24. Marques, D., Guerreiro, T., Carriço, L., Beschastnikh, I., Beznosov, K.: Vulnerabil-
ity & blame: Making sense of unauthorized access to smartphones. In: Proceedings
of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. pp. 1–13
(2019)
25. Mayer, P., Volkamer, M.: Addressing misconceptions about password security effec-
tively. In: Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust. pp. 16–27
(2018)
26. Miller, R.: That time i got locked out of my google account for a
month (December 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/22/
that-time-i-got-locked-out-of-my-google-account-for-a-month/
27. Nissenbaum, H.: Privacy as contextual integrity. Wash L. Rev 79, 119 (2004)
28. Patrick, A., Kenny, S.: From privacy legislation to interface design: Implement-
ing information privacy in human-computer interactions. In: Privacy Enhancing
Technologies. pp. 107–124. Springer, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidel-
berg (2003)
29. Redmiles, E.M.: “should i worry?” a cross-cultural examination of account security
incident response. In: 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). pp.
920–934. IEEE (2019)
30. Ruoti, S., Monson, T., Wu, J., Zappala, D., Seamons, K.: Weighing context and
trade-offs: How suburban adults selected their online security posture. In: Thir-
teenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2017). pp. 211–228
(2017)
31. Sambasivan, N., Checkley, G., Batool, A., Ahmed, N., Nemer, D., Gaytán-Lugo,
L.S., Matthews, T., Consolvo, S., Churchill, E.: ”privacy is not for me, it’s for
those rich women”: Performative privacy practices on mobile phones by women in
south asia. In: Fourteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS
2018). pp. 127–142. USENIX Association, Baltimore, MD (Aug 2018), https://
www.usenix.org/conference/soups2018/presentation/sambasivan
32. Sambasivan, N., Rangaswamy, N., Cutrell, E., Nardi, B.: Ubicomp4d: Infrastruc-
ture and interaction for international development–the case of urban indian slums.
In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing.
p. 155–164. UbiComp ’09, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA (2009). https://doi.org/10.1145/1620545.1620570
33. Seng, S., Kocabas, H., Al-Ameen, M.N., Wright, M.: Poster: Understanding user’s
decision to interact with potential phishing posts on facebook using a vignette
study. In: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. p. 2617–2619. CCS ’19, Association for Computing Ma-
chinery, New York, NY, USA (2019). https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363270
34. Stobert, E., Biddle, R.: The password life cycle. ACM Transactions on Privacy and
Security 21(3), 1–32 (2018)
35. Sukwong, O., Kim, H., Hoe, J.: Commercial antivirus software effectiveness: an
empirical study. Computer (3), 63–70 (2010)
36. Sultana, S., Saha, P., Hasan, S., Alam, S.M.R., Akter, R., Islam, M.M., Arnob,
R.I., Al-Ameen, M.N., Ahmed, S.I.: Understanding the sensibility of social media
use and privacy with bangladeshi facebook group users. In: Proceedings of the
3rd ACM SIGCAS Conference on Computing and Sustainable Societies (COM-
PASS’20). p. 317–318. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA
(2020). https://doi.org/10.1145/3378393.3402235
16 Kocabas et al.
37. Vashistha, A., Anderson, R., Mare, S.: Examining security and privacy re-
search in developing regions. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGCAS
Conference on Computing and Sustainable Societies (COMPASS’18). COM-
PASS’18, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA (2018).
https://doi.org/10.1145/3209811.3209818
38. Weiner, A.J., Ne’man, R.: Fallback identity authentication techniques (October 3,
2017), US Patent 9,781,105
39. Williams, C.: 620 million accounts stolen from 16 hacked websites now for sale on
dark web, seller boasts (February 11, 2019), https://www.theregister.co.uk/
2019/02/11/620_million_hacked_accounts_dark_web/
40. Zhang-Kennedy, L., Chiasson, S., van Oorschot, P.: Revisiting password rules: facil-
itating human management of passwords. In: 2016 APWG symposium on electronic
crime research (eCrime). pp. 81–90. IEEE, IEEE, Toronto, ON, Canada (2016)
41. Zou, Y., Mhaidli, A.H., McCall, A., Schaub, F.: ” i’ve got nothing to lose”: Con-
sumers’ risk perceptions and protective actions after the equifax data breach. In:
Fourteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018). pp. 197–
216 (2018)
